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Coping with Multicrisis: Sea Power and Global Politics in the Missle Age

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end of this century . . ." Route 10 runs through territory of the Republic of Panama. Construction cost is estimated at $2.88 billion, at 1970 price levels. The report concedes that the Commission cannot predict whether growth in traffic, the time when the new canal becomes operative, the interest rate on the project indebtedness, or payments to the host sovereign will permit amortization of the construction costs out of toll revenue.

Should a new canal be built in the equatorial region between 5° and 10° N. latitude, where both climate and politics can be torrid? (The Gulf of Campeche-Gulf of Tehuantepec ["Route 1"] route through politically stable Mexico is given the barest mention in the report.) Is the rubble of excavation only an economic burden, or could it be turned to a profit when used as fill for coastal industrial site development, borrowing such techniques from the Dutch and Japanese? If we decide to move the rubble for such purposes along the axis of the isthmus, are we led to think seriously of a Texas-to-Colombia rail link? Can the heavy lift helicopter, proven in Vietnam, play a role in this project? Is there a role for the technology of giant conveyor belts in moving excavation debris? Some years ago, studies were made for a Lake Erie-Ohio River bulk cargo conveyor belt system of comparable magnitude to what a canal project would require.

The reader will not find such questions discussed in the report. Does the report, despite its thoroughness within the bounds set for it by the Commission, need an injection of questioning imagination? Let the reader decide. Any naval officer who believes in a high degree of interfleet mobility for major fleet units owes it to himself to study this monumental report—and to question it.

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Jonathan T. Howe. *Coping with Multicrises: Sea Power and Global Politics in the Missile Age.* Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1971. 412p.

The versatility of seapower is an article of faith among naval officers. However, since Alfred Thayer Mahan's studies there has been too little serious scholarly effort to ascertain the precise utility of seapower as an instrument of national policy. Commander Howe, currently on Dr. Kissinger's White House staff, has made a significant contribution in his analysis of the role of U.S. naval forces in two crises: the Quemoy crisis of 1958 and the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Both crises were further complicated by being second crises, occurring when the United States was already occupied with Lebanon and Vietnam, respectively.

Analysis of these second crises is complicated by an attempt to determine the vulnerability of the United States and constraints placed upon U.S. action by the preexisting crises. In this regard, lessons learned or techniques mastered by the decisionmakers in the management of the second crises are applicable to the very highest levels of government and have little to do with the actual influence and effect of the application of naval forces. Both the analysis of the crises themselves and the points Commander Howe makes are subtle and elusive.

Even so, this in no way diminishes the value of the study, which is based on extensive research, correspondence, and interviews with the principal military, naval, and political figures in each crisis. Important interviews and significant statements are included in the appendices.

For the naval officer as well as for the scholar, the value of the book lies in the questions it raises and the examples given. For example, how will the reduction in the size of the U.S. fleet, a diminished British presence East of Suez, and an expanding Soviet Navy

affect the capability of the United States to act meaningfully in future crises in fairly remote places of the world?

As the author indicates, part of the answer to this question lies in an examination of the "political and military effectiveness of warships as instruments of U.S. policy during the early cold war, at present and in the future. . . ." Such an examination is particularly relevant in view of the Nixon Doctrine and the blue-water strategy it implies.

In the Quemoy crisis of 1958, our initial obligation to the Republic of China was based on a mutual security treaty. However, the island of Quemoy, clearly not one of the Pescadores or part of Formosa, remained in a limbo of ambiguity. For various reasons the President concluded that Quemoy must be held, but maintained a deliberately vague public position. Naval forces provided a low-key and well-controlled means of demonstrating an unequivocal U.S. interest and determination by escorting Nationalist Chinese resupply vessels up to territorial waters, while remaining outside the range of shore batteries.

The absence of Soviet naval forces from the area in the Quemoy crisis placed the Soviets at some disadvantage in their attempts to support Peking. By 1967 the Soviets had a sizable fleet in the Mediterranean, sufficient to intervene on behalf of their Syrian allies if the Israelis sought objectives beyond the Golan Heights. However, the presence of the 6th Fleet was enough to indicate to the Soviets that they could not act with impunity in the eastern Mediterranean. The 6th Fleet showed the value of naval forces for purposes of interposition. As between the two nuclear superpowers, the mere presence of the U.S. ships placed the risks of escalation on the Soviet Union, thus inhibiting Soviet naval initiatives. The intriguing question which Commander Howe does not address is how much of a fleet is enough for purposes of interposition.

By presenting detailed case studies of two crises, Commander Howe has provided a significant amount of raw material for further analysis. For example, what were the precise objectives of the United States? What were the assumptions upon which these objectives were based? Was U.S. national power directed in a comprehensive manner in order to establish control to achieve specified objectives? (This is the definition of strategy.) Can generalizations be made as to the possible future uses of naval power as a result of these two crises?

A serious, scholarly work, *Multicrises* is by no means dull. The final chapter on problems of the 1970's raises additional questions and suggests many possibilities. One is the utilization of regional naval or maritime arrangements to achieve common objectives. Both the scholar and the military professional concerned with security problems cannot ignore this seminal work.

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Rostow, W.W. *Politics and the Stages of Growth.* Cambridge: University Press, 1971. 410 p., index, illus. Hardbound and paperback eds.

This work is obviously one Dr. Rostow *wanted* to write. It is an excellent marriage of politics and economics which results in a clear expression of the Rostow thesis on the economic stages of growth and the role of politics in the American society. To some extent it is both a defense rationale and defense apologia of his life in academia and public service.

It is a specific, all-inclusive, positive treatise about concepts, matters, and things that other authors usually treat in general or less specific terms. He is clearly willing to stand and be counted. Dr. Rostow tends to develop his points and supporting arguments in groups of threes—first, second, and third.

A preface and introduction make the